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A study of the constitutional and statutory basis for
the use of depositions in courts-martial; and a review and
examination of the leading military cases in which deposi-
tions have been properly or improperly employed by the pro-
secution.
jun
"Another" principle of the lav,' of evidence embodied in
the constitutional limitations is that the defendant must be
confronted with the witnesses who testify against him",
William Howard Taft
;f
...I should be afraid to lay down a rule which would
deprive a prisoner of the advantage of having a witness for
the prosecution against him examined and cross-examined be-
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In the opening paragraph of an article comparing fed-
eral and military criminal procedure, Judge George W. Latimer
of the United States Court of Military Appeals wrote :1
;tBecause many members of the legal profession have a
mistaken belief that the representation of clients before
military courts requires specialized knowledge of mili-
tary law and appellate proceedings ,. and the employment
of courtroom tactics and techniques different from those
employed in civilian courts, they hesitate to represent
s e r v ic emen and s e rv i cewome n .
"
While it may be literally correct to say that counsel
defending cases before courts-martial require no specializ-
ed knowledge of military law, it must be conceded that such
kno"ledge---particularly of the law governing the use of
depositions in courts-martial could .prove very useful to
either civilian or military counsel appearing before mili-
tary tribunals.
Although Congress, in enacting the Uniform Code of
-'Latimer ,. A Comparative Analysis of Federal and Mil i-
tary Procedure, 29 Temple "I . ^. I (1955).
2Military Justice, 2 added certain civilian characteristics to
military procedure, there are still many dissimilarities be-




permits depositions to be used in military proce-
dure differently than they .may be used in criminal trials in
federal court, because of this difference, it may prove worth
while to examine the law and case holdings on the subject.
~?he Uniforr Code of Military Justice has been revised,
ified, and enacted into law as Chanter 47, Title 10,
United States Code, sees. 301-940. Although certain articles
of the Uniform Code of iiilitary Justice have been restated in
Title 10, they have not been substantively changed. Herein-
er, the Uniform Cede of Military Justice will be referred
to in the text as the Code, arid will be cited by article as
UC !<J. hen si rovisions are quoted, the language
will be that of -the Code.
^UC^J, Art. 49 provides: *(a) At any time after charges
have been signed as provided in article 20, any party may
take oral or written depositions unless an authority competent
to convene a court-martial for the' trial of such charges for-
bids it for good cause. 'If a deposition is to be taken be-
ore charges are referred for trial, such an authority may
designate officers to represent bhe prosecution anc? the de-
fense and may authorize such officers to take the deposition
of any witness.
(b) The party at whose instance a deposition is to be
taken shall give to every other party reasonable written
notice of the time and place for taking the deposition.
(c) Depositions may be taken before and authenicated
by any military or civil officer authorized by the lav:s of
the United States cr by the laws of the place where the dep-
osition is taken to administer oaths.
(d) A duly authenicated deposition taken upon reason-
able notice to the other party, so far as otherwise admissi-
ble under the rules of evidence, may be read in evidence be-
fore any military court or commission in any case not capital,
or in any proceeding before a court of inquiry or military
board, if it appears
—
(1) that the witness resides or is beyond the State,
Territory, or District in which 'the court, commiss-
ion, or board is ordered to sit, or beyond the dis-
tance of one hundred miles from the place of trial
or hearing; or
(2) that the witness by reason- of death, age, sickness,
bodily infirmity, imprisonment , military necessity, •
nonamenability to process, or other reasonable cause,
is unable or refuses to appear and testify in person
at the place of trial or hearing;, or
(3) that the present whereabouts of the witness is
unknown
.
(e) Subject to the requirements of subdivision (d) of
this article, testimony by deposition may be adduced by the
defense in capital cases.
(f) Subject to the requirements of subdivision (d) of
this article, a deposition may be read in evidence in any case
in which the death penalty is authorized by lav; but is not
mandatory, whenever the convening authority shall have direct-
ed that the case be treated as not capital, and in such a




CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY B..SIS FOT. TIIE USA OF DEPOSITIONS
IIT COUATS-iI^TIAL
It is veil settled that the sixth amendment to the
United States Constitution guarantees to persons prosecuted
in federal courts the right to be confronted with the witness
against him.^ It is also generally agreed that the right of
confrontation is essentially the right of cross-examination 5
,
and that cross-examination ;?cannot be had except by the direct
and personal putting of questions and obtaining immediate
rs%6 The sixth a:nendme.n- , which came into force Decem-
ber 15, 1721, did not originate the right of confrontation, bu
it preserved to every individual the right of confrontation he
possessed at the time it was adopted, that is, it preserved
the right of seeing the witness against him face to face,
and of subjecting him to the ordeal of cross-examination7 .
Military authorities, however, historically have
*Orf ie Id , Cri -in al Procedure from Arrest to Appeal
,
(1947) p. 325. ,rThis guarantee serves a real purpose. Wit-
nesses are more disposed to talk freely and untruthfully in
the absence of the defendent."
5
'.:igmore, Evidence (3d Ed., 1940), sec. 1395.
6 Ibid.
7
""attox V; United States , 156 U.S. 237 (1395); Salinger
v. United States, 272 U.S. 542 (1926).
5maintained that military persons do not have the right of
personal confrontation when tried before military courts-
martial.® This position finds support in "Ex parte :lilligan, 9
a case in which the Supreme Court said that neither the fifth
or sixth amendments abridged the power of Congress to provide
for trial and punishment by military courts, and "that the
power of Congress in the government of the land and naval
forces and of the militia, is not at all affected by the
fifth or any other amendment."
In the past, depositions were not permitted to be read
in evidence by the prosecution in criminal cases in federal
courts on the grounds that such practice would violate a de-
fendant's constitutional right to confront the witness against
him^°. Today, the use of depositions by the prosecution is
excluded by "Rule 15, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which permits depositions to be taken only upon the motion of
the defendant and then only for good cause when the court
determines that a failure of justice will result if permission
8V/inthrcr, Military Law and Precedents (2d Ed., 1920
reprint) 287 n. 27* whore it is said that the right to be con-
fronted by the witness against him. has reference only to crim-
inal cases in federal civil 'courts and has no application to
trial by court-martial.
9Ex parte 'Iilligan , 4 '..all (71 U.S.) 123 (1867).
10 In motes v. United States , 178 U.S. 458 (1900) the
Court said, ,rV.e are of the opinion that the admission of
Tayler's statement or deposition taken at the examining trial
was in violation of the constitutional rights of the defend-
ants to be confronted with the witnesses against them..."
6tc take the deposition is net granted.
In military procedure, however, depositions were and
are commonly used by both the defense and the prosecution.
Based on military necessity, early legislation permitted dep-
ositions to be used by the prosecution in trials by courts-
martial, provided the accused was present when the deposition
was taken. As far back as 1786, before the adoption of the
sixth amendment to the Constitution, an article of m r^ per-
mitted deposition testimony to be read in evidence if the
accused was present when it was taken. Later legislation! 2
,
enacted after, the adoption of the sixth amendment, continued
this safe-guard, and none of the more recent enactments of
Congress in this field, including Article 49 of the present
Uniform Code of Military Justice, denied an accused the right
to be. present at the taking of a deposition and to question
the prosecution 1 s witnesses Lnst him. Neither, however,
did legislation after 1805 specifically provide that an ac-
cused person should be present at the taking of a deposition.
11Article 10, Articles of War of 1786 provided: i70n the
trials of cases not capital, before courts-martial, the dep-
ositions of witnesses, not in the line or staff of the army,
may be taken before some justice of the peace, and read in
evidence, provided the prosecutor and person accused are pre-
sent at the taking of the same.
12Article 74, Articles of :/ar of 1806 provided: "On the
trial of cases not capital, before courts -martial, the deposi-
tions of " Witnesses ,_npt in the. line or staff of the army, may
be taken before some justice of the peace, and read in evi-
dence, provided the prosecutor and person accused are present
at the taking of the same, or are duly notified thereof."
7Because of the omission of words specifically -requiring the
presence of an accused, military authorities limited the right
of confrontation to propounding written interrogatories, and
rarely permitted military persons to appear and personally
cross-examine the deponent. 13
It has been contended that Congress was cognizant of
the military view and practice regarding the taking of dep-
ositions, and that it impliedly approved and adopted both
when it enacted Article 49 without specifically providing for
personal confrontation and direct cross-examination. Addi-
tionally, it has been argued that Congress was aware of the
unusual difficulties encountered in trying military offenses,
particularly under wartime conditions when transportation of
military witnesses over long distances might seriously affect
military missions.^-- And that Congress intended tha t deposi-
tions would be taken without the accused being present, pro-
vided notice was given to him, his defense counsel, or a
designated officer he consents to have represent him at the
i^VJinthrop, Nil
i
tary Law and Trecedents (2d Ed., 1920
reprint) 255-257. Also see Oil 329496, Deligcfo , 78 BR 43
holding that a deposition taker out of the presence of the
accused on written interrogatories' was properly received in
evidence even though defense counsel objected at the taking
and at trial that the accused was entitled to confront the
witness against him.
^Hearings before the House Sub-Committee of 'the Com-
mittee on Armed Services on H. R..2498, 81st. Cong., 1st.
Sess.
, P . 696 (1949) .
taking.
0,. the other side of bhe coin, there are indications
in view of its historical concern in earlier Articles of War
for an accused's ri ' t to be present at the taking of a dep-
osition that ,ss did not intend Article 49 to deprive
an accused pe. of tiis right to present. Indeed, in
hearings before the House Sub-Committee considering then pro-
posed Article 49, there were verbal ex -es^ 5 which point
in the opposit direction and indicate t.1 - t ' Lie it was in-
tended that the prosecution should have the right to take
depositions, i1 understood that the accused would have
ri ;ht to be t.
"Mr. Finn/speaking on behalf of the American Legion/.
Veil as I understand the present Federal program, the ac-
cused or defendant can have depositions introduced in his
behalf but 'the prosecution cannot. This /Article 4_9_7 as




-'"Depositions may be used in British court-martial
trials but only if taken in the presence of the accused.
Manual of Military Lav 1951, Part I, Chapter IV, Sec. 64,
p. 84. See also Piiipson, Evidence (8th 3d. 1942) page 492
where' it is stated that depositions are admissable against an
accused" in criminal proceedings in Great Britain under the '
Criminal Justice Act, 1925 w . i witness is dead, insane,
or so ill as not to be able to travel, but the deposition
must be taken in the presence and hearing of the accused.
The omission of this requisite cannot be cured by reading
over and reswearing witn sees in his presence, for such a
method obviously allows a very imperfect opportunity for
cross-examination and a full opportunity for cross-examina-
tion is imper ative
.
and American17 justice as to the right of the person ex-
cused to the confrontation of witnesses against him.
7?
!.n?. Elston. Well, we have a law in the State of
Ohio, for example, that permits the State to take dep-
ositions, but means and the opportunity must be afforded
to the defendant and his counsel to bo present at the
talcing of these deposit ions. 1®
"Mr. Brooks. This is what we call depositions bene
esse.
"
From these statements, it would seem that both Repre-
sentatives Elston and Brooks understood Article 49 to afford
military persons the same right afforded defendants by Ohio
law, and that their understanding was possibly shared by
other members of the House Sub-Committee.
Be this as it may, Congress, empowered by Article I,
section S, clause 14 of the Constitution "To make rules for
17Conrad, Modern Trial Evidence (1956) sec. 1205, cit-
ing Uni t ed Sta te s" v . Barracoor" et al ., 45 F. .Supp. 38 ( S.D.N.
Y. , 1942) . The accused in a criminal case has the consti-
tutional right to be confronted by the witnesses against him,
so that he may have the right to cross-examine them and so
that the jury may observe their demeanor. The right to con-
frontation by witnesses in a criminal case was a common law
right which was carried into the United States Constitution by
the sixth amendment. This requirement must be observed where
depositions are authorized in criminal cases.
•*-8Where depositions are taken by the State of Ohio for
use in a criminal case, the court by proper order must pro-
vide and secure to the accused the means and opportunity to
be present in person and with counsel at the taking of such
depositions, and to examine the witnesses against him face
to face, as fully and ir. the same manner as if in court.
See Hanna, Ohio Trial Evidence (1951) sec. 611.
10
the Government and Regulations of the land and naval forces",
enacted the Code and, as a result, Article 49, which permits
as free a use of depositions in military criminal trials
as Rule 26, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits in
federal civil cases, became effective in law on May 31, 1951.
On the same date, pursuant to an Executive Order, 19
the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1951 (herein-
after referred to as the Manual and cited as LTCM) came into
force and effect in the armed forces of the United States.
Certain paragraphs thereof particularly paragraphs 117 and
145a supplement Article 49 by prescribing regulations for
Lng and using of depositions in courts-martial. For
more than five years these paragraphs and Article 49 ha
constituted the authority for the use of written and oral
depositions in military c: al trials.
^Executive Order ITo 10214, Prescribing the Manual for




PROC^DU?.^ j OR TAICSCG DEPOSITIONS
Article 35 of the Code authorizes the President to
prescribe rules of procedure, including methods of proof in
cases before courts-martial, providing such rules are not con-
trary or inconsistent with the provisions of the Code. As we
have seen, the President by Executive Order Ho 10214 pre-
scribed the Manual, and therein, by paragraphs 117 and 145 a
,
set out the procedural rules and requirements for taking
written and oral depositions.
Paragraph 117 a defines a deposition as "the testi-
mony of a witness, reduced to writing, under., oath or affir-
mation, before a person empowered to administer oaths, in
answer to interrogatories (questions) and cross-interrogatories
submitted by the party desiring the deposition and the oppo-
site party." a deposition taken on oral examination is an
oral deposition; one taken on written interrogatories is a
written deposition. Either may be taken at any time after
charges alleging a violation of one of the punitive articles
of the Code have been signed against a person subject to the
Code, and only an officer competent to convene a court-
martial for the trial of such charges may forbid the taking
of depositions, and then only for good cause. Otherwise, if
taken on reasonable notice to the accused, his counsel, or an
12
officer he consents to have represent him at the taking,
prosecution depositions may be real in evidence in any mili-
tary criminal case net capital if it appears that the wit-
ness resides or is ^eyc 3 the state, territory, or district
in which the court is ordered to sir,. They may be received
in evidence also if the witness because of death, age, ill-
ness, bodily infirmity, imprisonment, non-amenability to
Dcess of courts-martial, or other reasonable cause, is
unable or refuses to appear and testify in person at the
trial; or if the present v;hereabouts of the v:itness are un-
known and cannot be determined after reasonably diligent
efforts.
In a capital case the defense may introduce deposit-
testinony but the prosecution may not, unless the de-
fense, in open court, expressly consents to its admission.
However, deposition offered by the prosecution may be
: dtted without the consent of the defense in a case not
capital being trie:1, together with a capital offense, if the
testimony contained in the deposition is not material to the
capital offense. Such testimony is also admissible even
though material, if the capital offense and the non-capital
of:°ense involved separate criminal transactions, but in such
a case the court must be instructed that the deposition
testimony must not be considered as material to the capital
offense. In addition, a deposition may be received and read
13
in evidence in ary case in which the death penalty is author-
ized but is not mandatory, whenever the convening authority
directs that the case be tried as not capital. In that event,
a death sentence may not be ad .judged.
If, after charges have been signed but before they
have been referred to trial, it appears that a witness may
not be available to testify at trial, the convening authority
may order his testimony be taken by either oral or written
deposition. Counsel for the Government and defense counsel,
acceptable to the accused, must be appointed to represent the
parties at the taking of deposition testimony.
After charges have been referred to trial and counsel
has been appointed to represent the Government and the accused
either may find it advisable to take the deposition of a wit-
ness. If a written deposition is desired, a list of interro-
gatories to be propounded to the witness should be prepared
and subsequently submitted to the opposing counsel. After
receiving and examining these interrogatories, opposing coun-
sel may prepare his own written questions for cross-exami-
nation, and at the same time may enter specific objections
to any particular interrogatory, or he may protest the pro-
priety or need of taking the deposition.
The request to take a deposition, the lists of in-
terrogatories and cross-interrogatories, and any objections
should be submitted to the officer ccmoetent to convene the
14
court-martial, or to the lav; officer or president of a
special court-martial, if a court has already been convened
and is in session. If the request to take the deposition is
approved, counsel for the government should send evidence of
such approval, alon " ith the written interrogatories and
cross-interrogatories to the commanding officer of the
military or naval installation nearest to the prospective
deponent, with the request that he designate someone author-
ized by law to administer oaths to toko the witness's dep-
osition.
rosecu ense coun-
sel are also authorized to take oral depositions, if statu-
tory grounds exist, unless forbidden by a competent convening
bhority for good cause. Like written depositions, they
must be taken before a person with authority to swear the
Ltness, but unlike written depositions, the questions and
cross-quostions are not in writing, but are propounded di-
rectly to the witness by counsel present at the hearing.
The examination and cross-examination of counsel and the
testimony of the witness is recorded verbatim, preferably
by a duly appointed and sworn reporter. mever possible
and practicable the accused person should be afforded the
opportunity to be present to personally face and hear any
witness testifying against him. Duly qualified represen-
tatives of the Government and the defense will, of course,
15
be present to examine and cross-examine the witness. When-
ever depositions, oral or written, are to be used in the
course of a trial by general court-martial, counsel for the
Government and the defense must be qualified lawyers in the
sense of Article 27(b)(1) and (2) of the Code, although they
need not be sworn pursuant to Article 42.
If the witness whose testimony is to be taken by oral
deposition resides or is far distant from the place of trial,
counsel wanting the deposition may prepare a letter to the
convening authority stating why the deposition is needed and
what testimony he hopes to gain from the absent witness.
Opposing counsel shall have the right to protest and oppose
the taking of the deposition, and to show good cause why it
is unnecessary. If, however, the taking of the deposition
is approved, counsel for the Government must forward evidence
of such approval, along with information concerning the
points to be covered by the oral deposition, to the command-
ing officer of the military or naval installation nearest the
witness. This officer is required tc designate a civil or
military person authorized to administer oaths to take the
deposition, and in addition, if the trial and defense counsel
are not to be present, appoint officers of his command to
represent both the Government and tiie defense at the deposi-
tion hearing. Any officer appointed to represent the accused
at such hearing must be accepted by the accused before he can
16
legally and properly act as his counsel. As stated before,
unless both representatives of the Government and the de-
fense are certified as competent to perform duties of coun-
sel before general courts-martial , depositions taken when
they acted as counsel will not be admissible in general
courts-martial
.
All questions propounded to and all testimony given
by the witness at the hearing must be accurately and fully
reduced to writingg After being transcribed, the witness
should examine the deposition and if any changes or correct-
ions in his testi: "ire necessary they should be made by
the hearing officer in tiic presence of both counsel and the
witness, while the witness is still under oath and subject to
further cross-examination. The witress then should sign the
deposition,' and it then is the duty of the hearing officer to
execute a certificate, stating that the witness, after being
duly sworn, gave the testimony transcribed in the deposition
in his presence. The signed deposition and duplicate copies
are then made available to both the prosecution and the de-
fense for use in the forthcoming trial.
17
CHAPTER IV
T±A USE 01? PROSECUTION DEPOSITIOI'S .APPROVED BY DIVIDED COURT
The attack on the legality and constitutionality of
those provisions of the Code and Manual which authorized the
prosecution to use depositions taken out of the presence of
the accused or counsel of his selection was not long in con-
ing.
In United States v. Sutton2 ^ the accused was convicted
by a general court-martial largely on the strength of a dep-
osition taken by the prosecution on written interrogatories,
neither the accused, nor the defense counsel who represented
him at trial and objected to the admission of the d eposition,
were present when the witness against the accused gave his
deposition testimony. However, an officer-lawyer who was one
of four appointed assistant defense counsel had previously
had an opportunity to file cross-interrogatories but had not
seen fit to do so.
Relying on United States v. Clay2 -'- wherein the Court
SOlJnited State s v. Sutton (No. 1718) 3 USCMA 220, 11
CMR 220.
21United States v. Clay (No. 49) 3 USCMA 74, 1 CMR
74..
18
of Ililitary Appeals 22 had enumerated the righto and priveleges
of persons subject to military lev,/, including the right of
confrontation, a Navy board of revi^v.^S reversed the con-
viction on the grounds that the admission of the deposition
violated this right. The Judge Advocate General of the Navy
certified24 the board's opinion to the Court and asked that
it finally decide this point.
In a two to one decisio" the Court reversed the board
of review and decided that the accused had received "military
due proce~s ,: under the Uniform Code of military Justice;
that he had been afforded the kind of confrontation he was
bitled to under the Code, scilicet, the right to propound
written cross-ir.te'-rogatories to an absent witness; and that
he had no right to :,face to face" confrontation as is guar-
anteed by the sixth i merit to the Constitution.
22UCII,T, Art. 67 established the Court of Ililitary Ap-
is composed of three civilian judges. It reviews (1) all
cases in which the sentence, as affirmed by a board of review,
affects a general or flag officer or extends tc death; (£) all
cases r i ed . by a board of revi -• - icii the Judge Advo-
cate General orders forwarded to the Court of Ililitary Ap-
peals for review; and (3) all cases reviewed by a board of re-
view in which, upon petition of the accused and on good cause
shown, the Court of Ililitary Appeals has granted a review.
23UCMJ, Art 66. Boards of review review every trial by
court-martial in which the sentence, as approved, affects a
general' or flag officer or extends to death, dismissal of an
officer, cadet or midshipman dishonorable or bad-conduct dis-
charge, or confinement for one year or more.
24UCHJ, Art. 67(b) (2),
19
Noting that no legislation since Articles of War of
1806 had provided for an accused person to be present at the
taking of a deposition, the majority concluded that Congress
did not intend his presence under Article 49.
Writing for the majority, Judge Latimer said:
"It seems crystal clear that Congress had no intention
of limiting the use of a deposition to those cases where
an accused could be present at the time of its taking2^.
The Code specifically provides for written depositions
and implicit in this procedure is the contemplation that
an accused will not be present. Congress was familiar
with the difficulties encountered in trying- military
offenses, particularly under wartime conditions... It is
reasonable to conclude that because of these inherent
difficulties Congress permitted the taking of a deposition
,
by the prosecution,, if .notice thereof was given "to the
accused, his counsel, or an officer designated to repre-
sent him in the taking of the depositions."
__
&,
^But see Hearings before the House Sub-Commit tee of
the Committee on Armed Services on H. R. 2498, 81st. Cong.,
1st. Sess., page 1069, where Representative Els ton said
"''hen you take a deposition the accused has the right to be
present and with counsel. If it is taken orally and not by
way of interrogatories both sides can examine the witness."
Also, in determining Congressional intent, it appears
the Court failed to consider the sense of the Senate announc-
ed in the July 15, 1953 Resolution of Ratification, with
Reservations, of the Status of Forces Agreement (Agreement
Between the Parties to the 'North Atlantic Treaty Regarding
the Status of Their Forces, 19 June 1951 (T. I. A. S. 2846)
wherein the Senate recognized and sought to preserve for
members of American armed forces tried by receiving State
tribunals those basic "constitutional rights he would enjoy
in the United Statvi.s ;:
. Neither did the- Court's decision re-
fer to Article VII, Status of Forces Agreement nor to Amend-
ment of article XVII of the Administrative Agreement Under
Article III of the -Security Treaty Between the United States
and Japan (T. I. A. S. 2G48) both of which entitle American
military persons "to be confronted with the witness against
him' : when prosecuted in the courts of a foreign signatory.
so
111 a concurring opinion, Judge Erosman approved the
results reached in the principal opinion, and in addition ex-
pressed doubt that the Court of Military Appeals possesses the
po*A/er to hold an act of Congress unconstitutional—even in
part.
Chief Judge ^uinn dissented from the majority opinion.
In his opinion the sixth amendment' guaranteed accused per-
sons in the military the right, at some stage in the proceed-
ings against him, to cross-examine a witness against him by
direct and personal questioning in the s< me manner as in
court. Although military courts have the same responsibility
as do federal courts to protect a person from a violation of
his Constitutional rights, Judge ?;uinn felt that the majority
lightly deprived the accused of the basic constitutional
right of confrontation for reasons of expediency. 26
^Federal civil courts have jurisdiction and the re-
sponsibility in habeas corpus proceedings to determine
^ther a military accused's basic constitutional rights
have been denied him in a court-martial trial, and to pro-
tect him from a violation of his constitutional rights.
Burns v. ! 11 3 or., 346 U. S. 137 (1953). See also the dissent
in this case where -ir. Justice Douglas said: "Of course the
military tribunals are not governed by the procedure for
trials prescribed in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. That
is the meaning of Ex -carte y.iirin , 317 US 1, 87 L ed. 3, 63
S CT 2, holding that indictment by grand jury and trial by
jury are not constitutional requirements for trials before
military commissions. Nor do the courts sit in review of
the weight of the evidence before the military tribunal.
Vfelchel v. McDonald
,
supra, p 124. But never have we held
that all the rights covered by the Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ments were abrogated by Art. 1, s. 8, cl 14 of the Consti-
tution, empowering Congress to make rules for the armed
£1
The intent of Congress which the majority found
'crystal clear" in one direction was clear in' another to the
chief judge. To him, Congress, in enacting Article 49, in-
tended only that depositions could be taken and introduced
into evidence by the Government as well as by the accused.
He did not believe that Congress intended that the accused's
right to personal and direct cross-examination—
'
? the greatest
legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth" 27
should- be reduced and limited to the mere submission of
written cross-questions to an unseen witness whose testimony
had not been heard. In Judge '"'.uinn's view it would impose
no undue or uncommon burden upon the prosecution to require
the presence of the accused, or counsel of his choice at the
taking of the deposition of a witness, so that he could face
his accuser .and test the accuracy of the testimony against
him.
A little more than two years after the decision in
forces. I tii ink it is plain from the text of the
Fifth Amendment that that position is untenable. 1.
Federal courts in habeas corpus proceedings have re-
cognized that some of the rights specifically enumerated in
the fifth and sixth amendments are applicable to the military,
V;ade v. Hunter, 336 U. S. 684 (1949), Powers v. Hunter , 178
F. ?.d 141 (10th Cir.. 1949), Richardson v. Zup_p, 81 F. Supp.
809 (M. D. Pa., 1949). They will consider whether a trial
by court-martial violated a military person's basic consti-
tutional right to due process. United States v. Hiatt, 141
F. 2d 664 (3d Cir., 1944).




Judge Brosman, the concurring judge, died and Judge
Homer Ferguson, a former Michigan jurist and ex-United States
Senator, was appointed to the bench of the Court of Military
. >peals. As a result of this change in the composition of
the Court, and in view of the vigor and rationale of Judge
C'uinn's dissent, there was speculation on the part of some
military and naval lawyers that the Sutton decision would be
overruled in the future. is speculation was dispelled,
however, by the Court's recent decision in United States v.
Parrish . ° With Judge uinn again dissenting, Judge Ferguson
joined with Judge Latimer to reaffirm the principle announced
by the majority in the Sutton case.
It is interesting to note that the majority in both
tton and Parrish carefully avoided mention of Article 10
of the Articles of '. :ar of 1785. It also avoided the fact
that Article 10, which was in effect when the sixth amend-
ment was adopted in 1791, specifically provided that a mili-
tary person had the right to be present when a deposition
against him taken* Having closed its eyes to Article 10,
the majority spared itself the task of explaining why the
.right of confrontation granted to military persons by the
article was not continued and preserved by the sixth amend-
ment. .It spared itself the task of explaining what the
28United Sta tes v. Parrish (No. 8181), 7 USCI1A 337,
22 CMR 127.
23
Supreme Court meant in Mattox v. United States and Salinger
v# United State s when it held that the sixth amendment se-
cured to every individual the right of confrontation he
possessed at the time it was adopted.
24
CHAPTER V.
til; atzzct or iaoc .ru^x araors in taxitg jd. aosatttqi.'S
With ths key question in Sut ton nov; definitely settled
as far as the Court of Military Appeals is concerned, we nay
turn to other points involved in the employment of depositions
in military procedure. An examination of the first twenty
bound volumes of the Court-Martial Reports (CMR) reveals that
they contain more than forty reported cases in which Army,
Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard boards of review have
considered and dealt with deposition problems. The Court of
Military A\ s has decided some fourteen cases in which
the issue of the admissibility of prosecution depositions was
directly involved. Procedural errors, committed by repre-
sentatives of the Gove -: . taking depositions are re-
flected in most of these cases. VJhat were the effect of
these errors? rid they rec that findings of guilty be
set aside? What determined in a particular case if a dep-
osition taken improperly or admitted erroneously prejudiced
substantial rights of an accused person? These answers, of
course, must be found in the decisiors of the Court of Mili-
tary Appeals, and in the opinions of the boards of review.
The Court has applied Article 59 of the Code 29 in
29UCKJ, Art. 59 provider: that a finding or sentence of
a Court-Martial shall not be held incorrect on the ground of
an error of lav; unless the error materially prejudices the
substantial rights of the accused.
determining whether evidence improperly admitted by means of
irregular or incompetent depositions required reversal of a
case. Such evidence has been held harmless when the accused
judicially admitted his guilt; when there was no dispute in
the testimony and the evidence of guilt was compelling; 30
when defense testimony was inherently improbable and unworthy
of belief; 3 -1- and when the testimony was merely cumulative and
too unimportant to affect the findings of guilt. oS
However, the fact that the Court has not reversed
certain cases in' which depositions have been improperly taken
and subsequently erroneously received in evidence, cannot be
construed as an invitation to ignore procedural requirements
of the Code and Manual. On the contrary., the court has
generally demanded strict compliance with these require-
ments. oc
Let us consider some cases in which procedural error
wag' in is sue.
In .United State s v. Drain 3^ a prosecution deposition
"
fflfaitW ' States v. Horner (i'o. 1031) 2 USCMA 478, 9
CMR 108.. " *. '" ' "•.•
^United, States; v. Drain (Wo. 4510) 4 USCMA 646, 16
GI4R 220 •
32lbid .
33United States v. Valll (Ho. 7860) 7 USCMA 60, 21
CMR 186.
34United States v. Drain (No. 4510) 4 USCMA 646, 16
CMR 220.
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was held inadmissible in a general court-martial where
neither the Government nor the accused were represented at
its taking by counsel certified in accordance with Article
27(b). 5;:) The- Court conceded that Article 49 doesn't require
any particular qualifications for such representatives, and
recognized that the i specifically states that they
need not be qualified lawyers. Nevertheless, it held that
it was the intent of Congress that an scoured person be af-
forded representation during the course of a general court-
martial by counsel qualified in accordance with Article 27(b),
also during the taking of depositions which are to be
used against in a general court.
The Court st: I that the skill with which the ex-
amination and cross-e: Lnation of tJ position *./itness is
conducted is highly important so important, in fact, that
unless those desigj : to represent the parties in the tak-
; of oral or v.ritten depositions are legally trained, the
fruits of their '.questioning" "may be worthless to counsel at
3%CMJ, Art. 27(b) provides: ,:^ny person who is ap-
pointed as trial or defense counsel in a case of a general
court-martial (l) shall be a oudge advocate of the Army or
Air Perce, or a law specialist of the Navy or Coast Guard,
who is a graduate of an accredited lav; school or is a member
of the bar of a Federal court or of the highest court of a
State; or shall be a person who is a member of the bar of
a Federal court or of the highest court of a State; and (2)
shall be certified as competent to perform such duties by





trial 1-evel. Stating that the broad use of depositions a-
gaingt defendants in criminal cases was exceptional to mili-
tary procedure, the Court refused 'to extend the exception in
a manner adverse to the interests of accused persons by hold-
ing that depositions may be taken without the provision of
certified attorneys to represent both the Government and the
accused. •'
Thus it was error to admit a deposition taken without
compliance with the requirements of the Code, but inasmuch as
the information contained in it was collateral, cumulative
and so incidental that it could have had no reasonable im-
pact' err the members of the court-martial, the error was
harmless.-
Citing and following the principle of lav; announced in
Drain , the board of review in Kennedy , (ACU 9347, 17 CMR
767) found pre indicia]- error where a deposition in which
certified lawyers played no part was received in evidence in
a trial by general court-martial, notwithstanding the fact
that the law • officer subsequently ordered. the deposition
withdrawn, and instructed the members of the court to dis-
regard its testimc. .
Recognizing the general rule that it may be presumed
that the members of a court follow the law officer's instruc-
tions, and disregard evidence which they are told to disre-
gard, the board of review, nevertheless, held that the impact
28
of the impressive but incompetent deposition was probably too
great to be erased from the mines of the members by instruc-
tion. Hence, it was held that the law officer's admonition
could not prevent the 3 ' mi of the deposition from preju-
dicing the accuse 3
.
united States v, Valli°^ presented a classic example
of how depositions she::' Id not be taker, or used. Almost every
procedural error that is possible to make, was made in the
talcing of deposition." in this case. After charges had been
referred to. trial, the trial counsel, defense counsel; and a
reporter traveled beyond the state to take oral depositions
• rtain prosecution witnes3e . Questions apparently were
propounded to .the witnesses by counsel, and presumably the
reporter recor their testimony. Thereafter, at trial by
leral court-martial, certain exhibits containing type-
written questions and answers were produced by the trial
counsel 'who stated tJ sired to read the testimony of
the witnesses to the members of the court. There being no
objection from the defense counsel, . the 'depositions were
read into the record.
Labeling most depositions 'tools for the prosecution
which cut deeply into the priveleges of an accused," the
Court refused to condone halfway measures in taking
36United States v. Valli (No. 7G30) 7 USCIIA 30, 21
C:S 186.
29
depositions by the prosecution, and on the contrary, demanded
strict compliance with the procedural requirements of the
Code and Manual. Then, perhaps noting a growing proneness
on the part of the Government to turn courts-martial into
trials by paper, the Court warned that depositions should
only be used when it is unreasonable to have live witnesses
present. Furthermore, the Court admonished, whenever the
costs of having a witness testify in court are substantially
the same as, or less than, the expanse of taking depositions,
and the witness is amenable to process, the witness should
be presented at trial.
Finding that almost every procedural requirement and
condition imposed by the Code and Manual had been violated,
the Court listed the following errors: There was no order or
dssion issued to take the depositions; the identity of
the officer or officers before whom the depositions were
taken is not shown; the form of the oath used, if any, was
not revealed;^" if an oath, was given, the identity of the
person administering it, or his authority to do so, was not
established ; 38 the reporter was not show;: to have been
^"par. 114, MCI I requires all persons whose testimony-
is taken by deposition to be sworn in the following form:
"You swear (or affirm) that the evidence you are about to
give shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
the truth. So help you God."
33par. 113, MCIi.
30
sworn;39 the time or place of the hearing was not shown; the
transcribed t ot read by the witnesses, and no
opportunity. was afforded them to make any changes or correc-
tions; 10 the purport . isitions were not signed by the
deponents, or sworn tc as : true and correct; 41 the rea-
son for the lack of signatures "was not s , except, possibly,
haste ;.- there was mo c - by t reporter concerning
accuracy and completeness of 1: is transcription; and there
3 no verifj : Lon the fact that the testimony received
in evidej c e testim ' y the witnesses.




.e coj •' . bating the reasons why
>ositions 5 and outlini i ters to be cov-
ered in the oral sxsininaticn of t ' itnes: . Submission of
these pa c bhority is an important step in
the procBSs of obtainir ; roval tc take depositie ss, for it is
at ' 1 . it counsel . : b accused may protest the
taking of the deposition tc one convening authority. At this
stage, counsel ma- uest that the \ itness be served with






tli3 convening authority concurs the deposition can not be
:en. Convening authorities have discretion in ordering or
approving the taking of depositions, and counsel for the
accused is entitled to a chance to oppose the Government's
request for depositions, and to show good cause why they
should not be taken.
In its most recent decision-^ involving depositions
the Court seems to have altered its view regarding the im-
portance of submitting '•to the convening authority memorandum
indicating the reasons for the depositions and the matters
to be covered by them. Mow the important thing is that coun-
sel for the accused be afforded the chance to oppose the
talcing of the deposition. If he is notified of the proposed
time, place and reason for taking the deposition, and thus
is able to protest the taking to the ' convening authority,
the requirements of the lav; are satisfied. Although he may
forbid the taking for good cause, it is not necessary that
the request to take the deposition be first referred to the
convening authority for his consideration and approval. Nor
is it essential to the validity of the deposition that his
authorization be obtained in advance. His action in this
. la tt e r is hege five r ather t hah po s i t ive
.
Boards of review of both the Navy and the Coast Guard
c; ±, 73.
4<5Uhited' States v.'" Oiarletta (3899) 7 U SCI la 600, 23
32
had the occasion to consider the effects of procedural aber-
rations in the taking of prosecution depositions. In. almost
identical cases, 4 purported depositions were taken after
rges had been served on the accused. Apparently, in both
cases, trial and defense counsel short-cut the procedural
requirements of the Ilanual, and took the depositions of wit-
nesses without someone do: ' oed to take the depositions or
authorized to administer oaths being present. Trial counsel
simply assumed this role and then resumed their own, examin-
the witnesses ai --osecutors.
Decidi at trial and defense counsel cannot get
together and informall; portions of the trial at such
times Laces as suit their convenience, the boards held
iat oral depositions must, be taken in accordance with the
sta '-3 of 117g. -hey must be taken in the presence of
officers authorized b; law to administer oaths. Such officers
must S1 the. witnesses, and the testimony must be given in
their- presence. Trial counsel may not act beyond their
authority- and assume two roles that of the prosecutor and
that of an impartial hearing officer.
The authority :f trial counsel to administer oaths
necessary to the proper performance of his duty does not
authorize him to administer oaths to witnesses in deposition
a 4.1




proceedings, nor doss it constitute him a proper officer
before whom a deposition may be taken when he has been de-
tailed as trial counsel in the proceedings.
It is improper for one officer to take a deposition
when another had been designated to take it, although a
failure on the part of the accused to object would consti-
tute a waiver of the error if the person who took the dep-
osition wa s , in fact, authorized b y 1 aw t c admin i s te r oa tn s . 4
5
However, a failure to object does not waive error where a
warrant officer of the United States Air Force designated
himself a "summary-court officer" and took a deposition. A
warrant officer of the Air Force is not eligible for appoint-
ment as a summary court-martial officer, and, possessing no
other authority, he could not administer a valid oath to a
deponent. Thus the purported deposition in this latter case
amounted to no more than an unsworn statement which was in-
competent evidence . -'°
Prejudicial error was found in uni te d States v. Miller4?
and the Court upset a conviction by general court-martial
because a. prosecution deposition was. improperly taken and
45ACM 6532, Kelly , 11 CMR 721.
/i6ACll 516.1, Butcher , 5 CMR 634.
47United States v. fi ller
,
(No. 7563) 7 USC11A 23, 21
CMR 149.
b4
received in evidence. The facts: disclose that after charges
had teen referred to trial the Government suddenly realized
that its principal witness against the accused was about to
be discharged from service and would, not be available to
testify at the time of trial. 48
Permission was promptly obtained from the convening
authority to take the witness's oral deposition. Without
consulting the accused, who was ca authorized leave and had
no notice that a deposition was to be taken, the convening
authority appointed a defense counsel who appeared at the
talcing of the deposition as the representative of the ac-
cused. 49 jt v;as not discovered until later that the accused
had already retained civilian counsel, who like the accused
had no notice of the taking of the deposition.
At trial the deposition was received in evidence ever
i8The court did not intimate or suggest that the wit-
ness should have been retained in the service so as to be
available to testify in -person at trial. This, plus the fact
that it denied a petition to review ACH 9439, Rogers , 18 CI©
515 seems tacit approval of that case's holding that an of-
ficer due for rotation need not bo retained in the command
for the purpose of testifying, and that a deposition taken
from him before his departure was properly admitted in evi-
dence. See also Unite d States .v. Ciarletta (No. 8899) 7
USCM.A 606, 23 Ci-ffi 70 "to the effect that the government's
discharge of a prospective witness does not deprive the prose-
cution of the right to use his deposition, particularly when
the defense fails to request the retention of the witness.
49JAGJ 1955/6088, 6 August 1953 approving such pro-
cedure may have been responsible for this error.
the defense's objection, after the Governments foundation
evidence had satisfied the law officer that the whereabouts
of the witness (now discharged from the service) were un-
known.
On appeal the Court reiterated the principle of
Sutton that a military person's right to confrontation is
satisfied if his qualified counsel is present at the taking
of a deposition, and he is accorded the right of cross-
examining the deponent. The Court made it clear, however,
that this does not mean the right of confrontation can be
satisfied by merely appointing and sending some military
lawyer to a deposition hearing without the knowledge of,
acceptance by, or consultation with, an accused. 5° To bind
an accused there must be acceptance and consent on his part. 51
It is a matter in which he has an important vote. There is
more to creating the relationship of attorney and client
than the mere publication of an order of appointment. The
5
^An accused's right to counsel of his own choice,
and the necessity 'of finding that he consented to represen-
tation oy appointee1 defense counsel was recognized in united
States v. Goodman
,
1 USCMA 298, 3 CI IF; 32, where it was said:
• ;He is entitled to select counsel of his choice, and may
object to being defended by the person appointed if he de-
sired tC dO SO.
"
The Court noted that the accused in this case was
on authorized leave, but did not indicate that its holding
would have been different if he had been on unauthorized
absence. It would seem that the language of the decision
is as applicable to the one" situation as to the other.
.36
relationship contemplates acceptance, confidence, trust, and
cooperation. Representation b- T strangers who do not even
know the theory of an accused's defense can be representa-
tion in name only and will not satisfy the letter or the
spirit of the Code.
In yet another case, ^ the Court was called upon to
determine the effect of procedural irregularities upon the
admissibility in evidence of : .. written deposition. Counsel
for the Government and the defense had prepared written in-
terrogatories and cross-interrogatories in order to obtain
testimony regarding certain laboratory tests. Correctly
foreseeing that the expert witness might not recall the re-
sults- of the particular bests and might have to use memo-
randum of past recollection recorded, it was requested that
sue. . Lorandum, if used, be sealed and returned with the
completed deposition.
The witness was uj to recall the results of the
laboratory test, and was able to testify concerning them
only by relying on memorandum. ever, he refused to
furnish the- memorandum so that it could, be included with the
deposition bec r .uL-e he. believed that he was .unauthorized to
do .so. At trial the deposition was received over objection,
and the accused was subsequently found guilty.
5%nited States v. Eergen (6642) 6 USCMA 601, SO 017,
.7.
37
On review, the Court held that the deponent's testi-
mony contained in the written deposition was nothing more
than a mere reading of the memorandum. Since the memorandum
was not included with the deposition, or made available to
the members of the court for examination, the deposition
was improperly admitted. However, inasmuch, as the deposi-
tion only corroborated that which, the defense itself had
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Article 49(d) i it clear that a deposition may
not properly bo admitted in evidence unless it appears that
the witnesses resides or is beyond the state, territory or
district in which the court is ordered to sit, 'or is more
than one hundred miles from the place of trial. Additional-
ly, if the witness b; reason of death, age, sickness, bodily
infirmity, imprisonment, military necessity, nonamenability
to process, or other reason cause, is unable or refuses
to appear and testify in person, or if the witness's where-
abouts are unknown, it is proper to receive his deposition.
Some federal courts in civil cases have permitted
foundations for the admissibility of depositions to be
established by scanty and meager proof. However, because
use of depositions in criminal trials is exceptional to
military law, the Court of "ilitary Appeals has required
that one of the conditions of Article 49(d) be established
clear, substantial, and competent evidence before a dep-
osition may be properly received. The prosecution, in par-
ticular, must bring itself within the statute before it will
be permitted to use depositions. Illustrative of this is
39
the case of United States v. Barcomb
,
5^ where the accused
was tried for unlawfully procuring a young woman to engage
in acts of prostitution. At trial the factual situation
was strongly contested, prosecution witnesses incriminating
the accused and defense witnesses denying his guilt. The
woman involved was the prosecution's principal witness, and
because of the posture of the evidence, her testimony was
of first importance. Prior to trial, on the assumption that
she would not be available for trial, a deposition of her
testimony was taken. 54 However, she appeared at trial and
was called and sworn as a prosecution witness. On the stand
she showed considerable emotional strain and refused to
answer questions put to her hy the trial counsel.' After re-
peated and unsucessful efforts to induce her to testify, the
law officer held her in contempt of court, excused her as a
witness, and over defense counsel's objection, admitted her
deposition in evidence.
On review, the Court turned to the provisions of
Article 49(d) and, finding that the factual situation fit
55United State s v. Barcomb (No. 726), 6 C5MR 92. See
also the civil case' of j/hitford v. Clark Count y, 119 U. S.
522 (1886) where it was held error to receive the deposition
of a witness who resided more than a hundred miles from the
place of trial but who was present in court and available to
testify in person at trial.
54par. 30e and par. 34d , I.ICM, 1951 permits this pro-
cedure .
40
none of the exceptions and conditions sot forth, held, that
the admission of the deposition was error---and in view of
tlie conflicting evidence error of a degree to require re-
versal.
A different, but understandably different, result
s reached in ACIl 7155, Duff, 55 12 CMP 302. A deposition
of a witness who resided beyond the state where the court
sat was introduced in evidence by the prosecution. The de-
fense neither objected nor i jsted that the witness might
be available to testify in person. Shortly after the pros-
option rested its c - .-.-
,
the deponent to the surprise of
3 prosecution appeared and testified for the defense.
On review the defense urged that it was error to receive in
evidence the deposition o^ a witness who was available and
o, in fact, was present and testified at trial.
In affirming the conviction, the board rejected this
claim of error, and held that the defense counsel had effec-
tively waived any error which might have existed. It said:
. strong argument in support of the foregoing view
comes from the realization that in a trial, and partic-
ularly in a long trial, the orderly processes of justice
might be seriously hampered were either side permitted
to sit idly by and permit depositions of numerous wit-
nesses to be properly received into evidence and then,
— R55Petition for review by USCMA denied, 13 CMR 142.
56united States v. Stringer
,
(No. 4071) 5 USClfo. 123,
17 CMR 122.
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by producing the witnesses in person require that the
case be virtually re-tried. Further support of that
view is found in the rule that the burden is on the side
opposing the acceptance of a deposition into evidence
on the ground of availability of the witness to inter-
pose objection at the time of its offer into evidence and
to come forward with some evidence of availability to
offset any prima facie showing of unavailability.
(Seiden v. Concordia Fire Ins. Co. of Milwaukee. 49 F2d
484; Patapsco Insurance Co. v. Southgate, Supra)".
Aside from the fact of waiver, the board indicated
that the deposition was properly in evidence, for although
the deponent may have actually been within the state and
within one hundred miles of the trial at the time her dep-
osition was received, her whereabouts were unknown to the
prosecution and the lav/ officer, and this was a sufficient
foundation for admission.
As we have seen, depositions may be employed only
under certain statutory conditions, and they may be received
in evidence only after at least one of the foundations for
admissibility set out in Article 49 has been established at
trial. Failure to erect a proper foundation caused the
collapse of United States v. Stringer* 5 ^ In this particular
court-martial tried in France, the accused was found guilty
of theft on the basis of a confession corroborated by a dep-
osition. The admission of the deposition was objected to at
trial by the defense on the ground that the deponent, a
56United States v. Stringer
,
(No. 4071) 5 USCMA 122,
17 CMR 122.
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French national, met none of the criteria which would permit
the use of her deposition. Nevertheless, it was received in
evidence for the reason that the deponent, being a 'French
national, was not amenable to court-martial process.
' In considering whether any of the conditions permit-
ting the use of depositions had been met, the Court noted
that the v;ords "State, Territory, or District" appearing in
Article 49(d)(1) refer to areas within the United States and
its territorial possessions, and since this court was sitting
in France this portion of the article had no application.
litionally, inasmuch as the deponent did not reside or
wasn't beyond a hundred miles of the place of trial, the dep-
osition wasn't admissible for that reason. There was no
pretension that the -.-hereabouts of the witness were unknown,
consequently the deposition was not admissible under Article
49(d)(2). The Court conceded that the French witness was
not amenable to court-martial process, but decided that this
fact alone didn't permit the use of her deposition. In order
for a deposition to be admissible under Article 49 (d) (2),
nonamenability to Drccess must be shown, and in addition it
must be established that the witness was unable or refused
to appear in person and testify. There being no such proof,
the deposition was improperly admitted in evidence, and since
it constituted the only corroboration for the confession, the
competent evidence was insufficient to support the findings.
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Although it reversed for another reason in United
States v. filler , supra, the Court stressed the importance
of establishing a firm foundation for the admission of a
deposition. In that particular case, the law officer admit-
ted the deposition over defense objection, although there
was no affirmative showing which would establish any of the
statutory grounds such as illness, infirmity, military
necessity or the like, and nothing more than hearsay evidence
was presented to show that the witness was more than a hun-
dred miles from the place of trial. Trial counsel sought to
show that the deponent's whereabouts were unknown, but he
failed to establish that diligent, timely, and thorough
efforts were made to locate the witness and have him present
at trial. Failure to locate the witness after two telephone
calls to his former home did not constitute diligent effort,
although the law officer did not require more in this case.
The search must be more than desulatory and indifferent.
Criticising the Government's use of depositions, the
Court said:
"Such meager efforts seem to suggest that some
Government prosecutors assume a careless and indifferent
attitude toward the taking and use of depositions. It is
to be remembered that they are a substitute method for
presenting facts to the detriment of the accused, and we
are not willing to permit halfway measures immediately
before trial to be made the basis for the use of that
type of evidence."
In a general court-martial it is for the law officer
44
to decide whether a requisite statutory foundation has been
established so as to permit a deposition to be received in
evidence. Els ruling cannot be overturned if there was
sufficient evidence for him to come to that conclustion.
Thus, where, as in j.iited States v. Ciarletta there was evi-
dence before the law officer that the deponent was discharged
from the active Marine Corps in California some two weeks
prior to ".rial; that his original entry into the service was
on the cast coast of the United States; that he represented
thru he resided on the east coast; and that he had been
given fundi to reach his claimed residence in New York, the
] .. officer was entitled to find that a proper foundation had
been laid for the admission of the deposition.
navy bo-rrd of review in reviewing a case 57 pursuant
to Article 66(c) of the Code was colled upon to decide
whether a foundation which established that a witness resided
beyond the State, but only thirty-five miles from the place
of trial was sufficient to permit the witness's deposition to
be read in evidence on behalf of the Government. The defense
argued that Article 49(d)(1) reasonably could be construed to
mean beyond the State or beyond one hundred miles, whichever
is greater ; ' The board refused to read this qualification into
the statute and decided that a deposition is admissible if
57NCM 221, Chapman, 11 CIS 639,
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either condition is established. Thus, the deposition of
a witness who lived across the street from where the court
sat could be read in evidence if he lived in a different
state. 58
5"What prompted Congress to include the ''beyond the
State {; provision in Article 49(d)(1), and thus pave the way
for the ridiculous results of Chapman and similar cases?
Since process of courts-martial like process of courts of
the United States having criminal jurisdiction, runs to any
part of the United States, its territories, and possessions,
why is -the fact that a witness resides or is beyond a state
grounds -for" using depositions?
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CHAPTER VII
USE 07 DEPOSITIONS III COITAL CASUS
The admissibility of depositions in capital cases is
controlled by- Article 49(d), (e), and (f) of the Code which
provides
:
? (d) A duly authenicated deposition token upon reason-
able notice to the other party, so far as otherwise ad-
missible under the rules of evidence, may be read in
evidence before any military court or commission in any
case not capital, or ih any proceeding before a court of
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: (e) Subject to the requirements of subdivision (d) of
this article, testimony by deposition may be aduced by
the defense in capital cases. 5 '
"(f)... a deposition may be used in evidence in any
case in which the death penalty is authorized by law but
is not mandatory, whenever the convening authority shall
have directed that the case be treated as not capital,
and in such case a sentence of death may not be adjudged
by the court-martial".
Paragraph 145a of the . ' X states:
;
'..A :ith the express- consent of the defense made or
presented in open court, but not otherwise, the court may
admit competent deposition testimony not for the defense
in a capital case.., : .
Thus, the prosecution may introduce evidence by dep-
osition in a capital case only if the convening authority
prior to trial directs that the case be treated as non--
capital, in which case the death penalty may not be imposed;
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or if the defense in open court consents to its admission. ^9
In United States v. Young, 60 the accused was tried by
general court-martial for willful disobedience of a superior
officer, and desertion, both capital offenses since they were
alleged to iiave been committed in time of war. The convening
authority took no action prior to trial to treat the case as
not capital.
Nevertheless, the prosecution introduced depositions
in evidence, and the defense counsel stated that he had no
objections to their admission. The accused was found guilty
and subsequently he appeal e'd;"'t'0' the- Court of - Military Appeals.
There he urged that the depositions were improperly received
in a capital case to his prejudice. Appellate counsel for
the Government sought to justify the admissions on the theory
that the defense expressly consented to the use of the dep-
ositions because at trial level he said he had no objection
to their admission.
The Court agreed that under certain circumstances the
statement of the defense counsel could be considered a waiver,
but could not agree, that the statement was the "express
^That Article 49 permits depositions offered by the
prosecutions to be used in not capital cases but excludes
"them in capital cases seems an irrational distinction to
VJigmore. See Wigmore, Av id once
,
(3d. Ed., 1940), sec. 1398
n. 4.
60United States v. Young (No. 1015) 2 USCIIA 470, 9
CI® 100.
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consent of the defense made or presented in open court" re-
quired by the Manual. Having held the admission erroneous,
the Court weighed its effect end found it harmless, particu-
larly as other evidence of record was such that "any fair-
minded and reasonable person would have been compelled to
find against the accused with or without the evidence con-
tained in the depositions''.
Substantially the same issue presented in Young was
involved in United S : tes v. aornor .^ Again the Court
found that the deposition should not have been admitted, but
found that its admission did not materially prejudice sub-
stantial rights of the recused. 62 It found that the deposi-
tion contained only an inconsequential bit of evidence, while
j other competent evidence of record was reasonable,
undisputed and unattacked.
.'.gain in United States v. Aldridge^ the Government
introduced depositions in a capital case which the convening
authority had not dir scted be treated as not capital. Again
the defense counsel neither objected nor consented to the
slUnited Sfr'tc s v. Horner (1031), 2 USCHA 478, 9 GR
108.
62UCMJ, Art. 59(a) provides that "finding shall not
be set aside unless the error of law materially prejudices
substantial rights of the accused.
65United States v. .Hdridge (No. 2886), 4 USCMA 107,
15 CMR 107.
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admission of the depositions. The court-martial found the
accused guilty, but on review the convening authority, noting
that depositions had been illegally used, approved only the
lesser included offense which was not capital.
On appeal the Court of Military Appeals reversed the
conviction, holding that the case had been tried on the theory
that a capital offense was in issue, and the law officer had
so instructed the court prior to its deliberations on the
sentence. Because the trial proceeded on that basis, the
accused had the right to have the depositions excluded from
the evidence. The ;no objection" reply of the defense coun-
sel did not constitute the affirmative and express consent to
use the depositions that is required, h- the Manual.
The admission of the depositions were prejudicial in
this case because the evidential posture was such that they
were essential to the Government's case, furnishing as they
did an essential fact to both the capital and the lesser
included not capital offense. ' ithout the deposition there
was insufficient evidence to permit either the capital or
the included not capital case to go to the triers of fact
for a finding of guilty. Whereas, in Horner the deposition
was inconsequential and added little, if any, weight to the
Government's case, here the depositions proved an important
part of even the lesser offense approved_ by the convening
authority.
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A somewhat different, problem was presented by a
common trial in which prosecution depositions were use-1
,
and
the accused was subsecuently found guilty of both a capital
offense and of a not capital one, following affirmance of
the conviction by a board of review, the Court of Military
Appeals grantee, further review on the question of whether
the prosecution depositions were properly admitted into
evidence.
ragraph 145a of the Manual provides that when
otherwise admissible, depositions not for the defense may be
.admitted without consent of the defense in a case not capital
tried with a capital case if such testimony is not material
to "Che capital case. Here the specifications alleged sepa-
rate offenses or cases, that is they alleged a capital of-
fense and a not capital offense. Since the testimony con-
tained in the disputed Repositions was related and material
only to the not capital case, • rA was immaterial as to the
capital case, the depositions were properly received in
evidence. D -
54Unitcd stat es v. Gann & Somme: (1425), 3 USCMA 12,
11CMR 12; accord' Lesley v. Munter, harden , 209 F. 2d 483
(10th. Cir. , 1953), an appeal from dismissal of a petition
for habeas -Corp --.s, -whereir. it was held that the use of a
prosecution deposition in a court-martial trial for a capital
case and several not capital cases did not deny the petition-
er confrontation, inasmuch as he consented in open court to




OTIlhlh EOIDiTG-S :TF3C riT'G TEL USE Oh DEPOSITIONS
An Air Force and a Navy board of review and the Court
of Military Appeals all have been confronted with the ques-
tion of whether the lav; officer or the president of a special
court must personally observe and pass upon the competency
of a deponent before his deposition may bo received in
evidence.
In Shade, ^° an oral deposition of a thirteen year old
boy who resided more than one hundred miles from the place
of trial was admitted in evidence over the defense's ob-
jection that the child's competency to be a witness had not
been determined^" in open court by the law officer. ^"
O'a rev lev;, an Air Force board held that the competency
of a child witness may be established by means other than
personal appearance before the. law officer; and that where,
65
,,CM 9442, Shade, 18 CMR 535 where a petition for
review was denied by the Court of Military Appeals.
° par.. 148b, IICM, provides the t the competency of a
person below the age'- of fourteen years to be a witness in a
court-martial cannot be presumed.
37United Sta tes v. liarshall & Shelton (ho. 548), 2
USCIvIA 54, 6 CMR 54, holding Fhat the decision whether a
child is competent to testify in a general court-martial
rests with the law officer.
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as in the instant case, the deposition shows on its face the
competency of the deponent, it may be properly admitted in
evidence.
In a very similar case, with the same problem present-
ed, a Navy board of review reached a contrary conclusion. 6^
It held that the admission of a six year old child's depo-
sition was erroroneous for the reason that the lav; officer
had received her deposition in evidence without first person-
ally observing her and qualifying her as a competent witness.
The Court of Military Appeals in Parrish69 resolved
this conflict of board opinions by adopting the view of the
announced in Shade. The issue in Parrish concerned the
admission in evidence of a written deposition taken by the
prosecution from its principle witness, T ~. As in most cases,
neither the accused nor his counsel were present when the
deponent gave his testimony, although the accused's counsel
prepared and propounded written cross-interrogatories.
Deposition testimony of three expert medical witnesses
introduced by the Government, tended to show that H was
psycotic from July 11 to August 20, 1954, a period prior to
the date on which his deposition was taken; that H was sane
and capable of remembering facts, understanding questions,
68NCI" 211, Tyson , 10 CMR 562.
69
llnited States v. Parrish (No. 8181), 7 USCMA 327,
22 cm 127.
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and appreciating the moral obligation of telling the truth
under oath on December 3, 1954, the day his deposition was
taken; but that shortly thereafter he showed signs of in-
sanity and was insane both on "December 28, 1954 and on the
date his deposition was received in evidence at trial.
Relying on United States v. Slozes , the defense
protested the use of the deposition net only because it denied
the accused the right of confrontation the argument in
Sutton but also becaus'e the law officer did not personally
observe II before qualifying him and admitting his deposition
in evidence. The defense also contended that the members of
the court by being denied an opportunity of personally ob-
serving arid hearing the deponent were unable to perform their
duties of judging the credibility of the witness.
The ,; Court nevertheless held that the deposition was
admissible, -and, in doing so, said that of necessity the lav;
officer must rule on a deponent's competency, and the members
of the court-martial must judge and ' determine his credibility
without ever seeing or hearing him. Any other "rule would deny
the use' of depositions.
The important question is whether the law officer and
7QUnited State s v. Slozes (Mo. IS), 1 USCIiA 47, 1 CM
47 quoted from Oliver v. United States , - 26 7 Fed. 544 (4th Cir.,
1920) "...In determining the competency, and intelligence of
a witness, the court may and should take into consideration
the general appearance and manner of the witness, _ as well as
the statements made by him.'"
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the court members were furnished with enough evidence, other
than by personal observation, to permit a fair determination
of competency and credibility. The Court concluded that in
this case the deposition testimony of three expert medical
witnesses* plus the evidence of competency supplied by the
deposition itself, - permitted a fair determination of this
question, and formed a sufficient predicate or foundation to
allow the deposition to be received in evidence and to be
considered by the triers of fact.
The same result was reached in United States v.
Ciarletta . although it conceded that the demeanor of a wit-
ness is important in assaying his credibility, and his credi-
bility is important to the .court when the testimony is dis-
puted, the .Court of Military Appeals, nevertheless re jected
the contention that an accused could be prejudiced because
the prosecution employed a deposition and thus denied members
of the court of an opportunity to observe the witness's
demeanor on the stand. If the deposition is admissible under
article 49, the court members must determine what weight to
give it without observing or questioning its maker.
A .general court-martial 7 ^- recently tried -in Germany
presented an unusual deposition problem. A fifteen year old
victim of a mass rape appeared and testified at trial against
71
CIvI 392899, Carter , 1 April 1957; compare United
itates v. Barcomb (No. 726) 6 C.P. 92.
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her seven assailants. She testified on direct examination
for approximately one hour, and was then subjected to vigor-
ous cross-examination for the remainder of the day a period
of approximately five hours. On the following day, she was
unable to appear in court. Three days later she resumed the
witness stand, but after being asked three questions began to
cry and stated she could not continue, /i recess and then a
continuance was granted so that the witness might regain her
composure and health. Ten days later, after several medical
examinations, an army doctor reported that the witness could
undergo further cross-examination in court only at the
:treme risk of breaking down and having some deep emotional
upset as a permanent factor". .In his opinion, her cross-
examination could be completed by oral deposition in the
presence of counsel for the prosecution and the defense, a
reporter, and a hearing officer, but not in the presence of
tfc e s e ven a c cu sed
.
On the basis of the doctor's opinion, the convening
authority ordered the case be treated as not capital, and,
over defense objection, the law officer permitted the re-
mainder of the girl's testimony on cross-examination to be
taken by oral deposition without the accused being present.
While, there is some danger that the procedure followed
here might permit a witness to lightly claim inability and
thus escape confronting in open court the person accused,
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nevertheless the ruling of the lav; officer under the particu-
lar circumstances seems proper. The objections of Parrish
and Ciarlotta that the members of the court-martial, being
denied an opportunity of personally observing the witness,
could not intelligently judge the credibility of the witness,
is not applicable here. The court members had ample opportu-
nity to observe her demeanor during a full day on the witness
stand at which time she gave seventy- five percent of her
testimony.
In assaying the correctness of the law officer's
ruling, it must be rem that in military law there is
no right to the physical presence of the witness at trial,
where good cause under Article 49 for his absence exists.
Neither has the accused the right to be present when the
witness against him test' . -" . / it an oral deposition hearing.
Cross-ex : at ion by counsel of Ms choice satisfies the
right of confrontation.
In .CM 12845, Dyohe , decided 24 October 1956, the
Government at trial level once again resorted to the use of
its favorite ' ; tool • The law officer admitted the deposition
of an official of the State of Illinois. The deposition re-
flected the deponent's testimony regarding certain official
records filed in the State's sub-office in Chicago. The
record of trial revealed that the deponent resided permanent-
ly in Blooming ton, Illinois, but performed his official duties
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for the State ox' Illinois in the State? s Chicago sub-office
and in its principal office in the capitol city of Springfield
Blooming ton is within one hundred miles, of the place where the
court-martial was held, whereas Chicago and Springfield are
slightly more than one hundred miles away. The deposition was
taken in Chicago.
On review an Air Force board of review approved the
conviction and held that the deposition was admissible under
7 P
Article 49(d)(1). it further determined that the deponent
was in Chicago and more than the required distance from the
place of trial when his deposition was taken. Finding no
proof to the contrary, -the board said it could be presumed
that the deponent remained at his part-tine office in Chicago,
and thus was more than a hundred miles from the place of trial
when his deposition was received in evidence. ?3
^Thus again on the shalcey basis of military necessi-
ty'' and the "unavailability" of a witness the prosecution was
permitted to use a deposition to prove its case, although the
deponent was readily amenable to court-martial process and the
Government could have reasonably had him present at trial.
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It is true, as was said in whit ford v. Clark County
,
119 U.S. 522 (1886) that where s witness lived more than one
hundred miles from the place of trial when his deposition was
taken, it will be presumed that he continued to live there at
the time of trial,- and no further proof on that score need be
furnished by the offering party, unless this presumption shall
be overcome. However, such a presumption, or more correctly,
such a justifiable inference is more properly indulged in when
the condition, which permits the use of the deposition is prob-
ably permanent and not temporary as in this case. See Wigmore,
Evidence, (3d., Ed., 1940) sec. 1414. United -States v. Dyche
( No . 9430) granted review on the question of whether the
deposition was properly admitted in evidence.
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In De Wald ,
'
4 certain depositions were offered by the
prosecution, were objected to by the defense, and were
received in evidence by the court. A number of typed answers
in the deposition either had been stricken or elaborated upon,
or both, by inked handwriting-. Each change or correction
bore initials corresponding to the names of the respective
deponents. However, no evidence was adduced to show that the
deponents had, in fact, made the alterations. The trial coun-
sel testified that prior to trial, after initially receiving
the depositions and noting apparent inconsistencies, he had
returned the depositions for "clarification*' to the military
organization which had taken them.
JL though., as has been previously noted, the Manual
provides that a deposition may be changed or corrected if it
does not correctly reflect the testimony of a witness, 75 the
procedure followed in this car improper. Here there was
no evidence that the nclarific; tion" was made by the re-
spective deponents, or if .- by them that they were still
under oath and subject to cross-examination by the defense.
Neither was there any evidence that the officer authorized
.
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..CM 7604, De eald , 13 CMR 851.
75par. 117e, MCM states that when the testimony is
fully transcribed, the deposition will be submitted to the
witness for examination, and any changes which the witness
desires to make shall be entered by the person taking the
deposition.
to take the depositions made the corrections for and with the
consent of the deponents, in the presence of counsel for the
prosecution and the accused. As a result, the alleged cor-
rections were nothing more than hearsay, and the altered
depositions were incompetent evidence.
Finally, in examining the case of United States v.
Gr aalum^ we discover that "before an accused may have com-
pulsory process for obtaining either military or civilian
witnesses in his favor, as is guaranteed by both the sixth
amendment and Article 46 of the Code 77 , he must not only
establish to the satisfaction of the convening authority or
the court, if in session, that the witness' expected testi-
mony is material and necessary, but he must also show that
.the witness' presence at trial is essential and that a dep-
osition will not enable him to fully present his defense. 78
76ACM 10050 Graalum, 19 CI-.© 667. Petition for review-
by UBCIIA denied, see 19 CAJR 415.
"^UCl'TJ; Art. 46 provides that the trial counsel, de-
fease counsel, and the court-martial shell have equal op-
portunity to obtain witnesses and other evidence by means of
process issued in court-martial cases. Such nrocess shall
be similar to that which courts of the United States having
criminal jurisdiction may lawfully issue and shall run to
any part of the United States, its territories, and posses-
ions.
78par. 115, MCM, 1951 provides, "...A request for the
personal appearance of a witness referred to the convening
authority or to the court for decision will be submitted in
writing, together with a statement, signed by the counsel
requesting the witness, containing (1) a synopsis of the
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This latter task is most difficult, since in military law, in
instances where the Code authorizes the use of deposition
evidence, the presentation of testimony in deposition fori: to
a court-martial is considered a reasonable and adequate meth-
od of presenting testimony. Thus, if the convening authority
or the court decides that a deposition will serve the defense
as well as the in-court testimony of the live witness, and if
the witness is one whose deposition may be taken under Article
49, the. convening authority or the court may refuse to issue
compulsory process to obtain the presence of the witness, and
the accused must defend with deposition testimony or nothing.
testimony that it is expected the witness will give, (2) full
reasons which necessitate the perso; al i ppearance of the wit-
ness, and (3) any other matter showing that such expected
testimony is necessary to the ends of justice," It is to be
noted that there is no specific 'provision i r. 115, IICII,
1951, as there was in par. 105a,. MOM, 1949, requiring the
accused, before he is entitled to compulsory process, to show
that a deposition would not fully answer the purpose. How-
ever, the board of review in Oraalum has read this require-




The primary object of the sixth amendment was to pro-
vent depositions or ex parte affidavits, such as were some-
times admitted in civil cases, from being used by the Govern-
ment against persons charged with crime. The purpose of the
amendment was to guarantee to an accused person the right of
a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness
testifying against him. It contemplated that the accused
would have an opportunity, not only of testing the recollec-
tion and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of
compelling the witness to stand face to face with those who
would decide the accused's guilt in order that they may look
at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the witness stand and
the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is
worthy of belief.
Although military courts have the same responsibility
as federal courts to protect a person 'from a violation of
his constitutional rights, and although the Constitution does
not withhold the right, of confrontation from a military per-
son because he is, at the time, serving with the armed forces
of his country, the majority of' the Court of Military Appeals,
nevertheless, has concluded that the sixth amendment does not
prevent the use of depositions against a military accused in
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a trial by court-martial.
As a result, prosecution depositions, inadmissible in
federal criminal trials, are commonly used against defend-
ants in courts-martial; and the accused is afforded no right
cf confrontation other than the doubtful one of propounding
written cross-interrogatories to an accusing v/itness whom he
nay never have seen and whose testimentary assertions he
probably never has hoard. Admittedly, depositions taken
on written interrogatories and cross-inte: rogatories possess
some trustworthiness, but trustworthiness can best be assured
by testing the witness's assertions by face-to-face cross-
.examinatibn. Mich of the effectiveness and value of cross-
examination is lost when it must be done by written cross-
interrogatories and the accused must guess at what the
witness may reveal or conceal.
Although there has been sporadic criticism of the use
of prosecution depositions i in the military itself, there
has been little serious civilian or Congressional opposition
to their use. It will be recalled that in the legislative
hearings on the Code only the American Legion protested the
use of depositions as denying an accused person the face to
face confrontation contemplated by the Constitution. Thus,
with no' demand for a change, there seems no likelihood that
Congress will amend the present law to limit the use of
depositions in courts-martial to that permitted in federal
53
criminal proceedings. Neither is there any reason to bc-
Lieve that Congress will change the law to provide for an
accused's presence when depositions against him are taken.
The difficulty of trying, military offenses under wartime
conditions will be sufficient argument for continuing the
law which prevents an accused in peace time from personally
confronting the deposition witness against him.
Although the Court of Military Appeals has decided
that a military accused has no right to personally face and
cross-examine the deposition witness against him, but has
only the right to propound written cross-interrogatories,
this question has not been directly ruled on by a federal
court. And while it may not be open to a federal court
simply to re-valuate evidence already dealt fully and fair-
ly with by a military decision, a federal court on habeas
corpus may consider a decision of the Court of Military
Appeals where the "constitutionality of a part of Article 49
is involved. This is particularly true since it is open to
question whether the Court of Military Appeals possesses the
authority to test the constitutional ity' of an act of Congress.
It is very possible that if a case factually similar
to button was brought before a federal court on a proper
application for a writ of habeas corpus, such court would not
agree with the Sutton holding but would agree with Judge
Q,uinn that the majority's application of Article 49 had
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denier1 the accused his basic constitutional right to con-
front the witness against him.
However, until sue!: a time, depositions will continue
to bo taken and used by ;he prosecution in much the same
manner as they presently are.
.-I though many errors in the taking and use of dep-
ositions result from the careless and indifferent attitude
assumed by some Government counsel, other errors in taking
and using depositions may be attributed to the fact that the
Lual provisions dealing with depositions lrc': clarity and
coherence. In order to correctly take and use depositions,
not oj ly must the procedural requirements of the Manual be
closely followed, but also the rulings of lav; announced in
numerous opinions and decisions must be carefully considered,
It is well to rer - that although the Court has
upheld the right of Congress to authorize the use of prose-
cution depositions in trials by courts-martial, it has also
)reciated that depositions for the most part are tools of
the prosecution which deny to an accused the privilege of
personal confrontation at trial. Therefore, the Court has
and will continue to demand reasonably strict compliance
with the procedural and substantive requirements of the Code
and Manual, and will not permit halfway measures to be made
the basis for the use of a substitute method for presenting
facts to the detriment of an accused.
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Prosecution depositions ere taken and usee1 in many
cases for the convenience of trial prosecutors rather than
for any real necessity of the armed services. They are re-
ceived in evidence because the witness is beyond the state
or beyond one hundred miles from the place of trial. In this
day of modern transportation, the horse-and buggy concept
which permits a deposition to be used for either of these
reasons is unnecessary particularly in peace time. As long
as the Government has the power of process to compell a wit-
ness to appear at trial to testify, it is difficult to under-
stand why depositions naec 1 to be taken from v ;itnesses who
live onl3<T thirty-five miles away but in another state, or who
work part-time in Chicago, one hundred and thirteen miles
distant from the place of trial. The Court of Military Appeals,
noting the great use of depositions by the prosecution, has
advised that they should be used, even when permitted by stat-
ute, only when the Government cannot reasonably have the wit-
ness present at the time of trial.
To avoid the unrealistic results of cases such as
Chapman and Dye he , and to prevent the unreasonable use of
depositions complained of by the Court of Military -.-peals,
it is submitted that Congress should amend Article 49(d)(1)
by deleting its present language, and substituting the follow-
ing: i: (l) that the witness resides or is beyond the distance
of five hundred miles from the place of trial or hearing, or
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that in tine of war the witness resides or is beyond one
hundred miles from the place of trial or hearing; or."
It is also concluded that paragraph 117a of the Manual
should be changed so as to reflect the decisions of Drain
and eliiler . This is necessary so that the errors conaitted
in those cases are act repeated in others. The necessary
changes may be made by simply deleting the third sentence of
the third paragraph of 117a, ana substituting the following
language
:
If a deposits ti is to be used before a general court-
rtial, however, the o?!Ticors representing both the
prosecution - _se must be certified as provided
5 reiele 27b. If the deposition is to be used before
a specirl c )urt-martial and the office:, designated to
represent the prosecution is qualified in the sense of
Article 27, the officer designated to represent the de-
fense must h t 1 est equivalent qualifications under
that erticl . If iposition is to be used before either
i general or special court-martial, the officer designated
to represent the accused at its taki y dc so only
with, i :noi ledge ana consent of tho accused.
CONTRIBUTION
••riters of military law texts from tne time of
Winthrop to the present have given little space or attention
to the use of depositions in cr.'.rts-martial.
ri t'.rcr, i . -illtary Lav; and". Precedents devotes seven
pages to the procedure for taking ana using depositions under
early Articles of War. S-adeke 3 in fflitr.iv Jm-.tic e Inner the
Uniform Code writes about four pages on tne subject. Aycock
and Vurfei in Ililitary Law Under the Uniform Code of Military
Justice treat depositions in less than three pages, while
Iker in Mil 11ary Law deals with depositions by including in
his book a single navy board of review opinion on the subject.
Edwards and Docke* in The Service Ua.n and the. Law devote less
than a page to depositions
•
rpv, _ -
r „ t ,
,
il lc . . . ...x.. .a O "P " "• '"> ' " • " ' 1 "i ". r - : ' \~i f Sr -Top'" +"
'
' ° ~ ^ t"
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under one cover current case law relative to the use of dep-
ositions under Article 49 of the Code. It is submitted that
this contribution will be of value to both the civilian lawyer
b.o occasionally appears as counsel before courts-martial, and
to the military lawyer who, day in and day out, prepares, tries,
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